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Stigma can restrain tax avoidance. Tax avoidance behavior by multinational firms has become
a public economics problem. Tax avoidance by firms may entail a kind of psychological cost,
known as stigma. We analyze the impact of a multinational firm’s profit shifting by multinational
transfer pricing on social welfare using a simple model that assumes the existence of stigma.
The results are as follows. First, stigma improves domestic social welfare more than the absence
of stigma does. Second, stigma improves global social welfare more than the arm’s length
principle, which is the OECD consensus on transfer pricing of cross-border transactions. Third,
the optimal degree of public exposure increases with the domestic tax rate and foreign market
demand. Our study has the following implications. First, our results imply that stigma has
implications for improving social welfare. Second, our results imply that regulators should
eschew the arm’s length principle and instead use stigma to improve the calibration of society
as a whole by restricting the behavior of firms, which can cause problems in trade between
nations. Third, in our study, because we find that choosing a positive degree of public exposure
maximizes domestic social welfare, our results suggest that public exposure effectively stops the
decline in social welfare caused by tax avoidance behavior in firms.
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Multinational firms, such as Amazon, Coca-Cola, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Nintendo, and
Starbucks, are now focused on social media, and use various management practices to increase their
profits. In particular, tax avoidance by multinational firms using multinational transfer pricing has
long been a focus of attention, the arm’s length principle has been used to prevent this behavior; this
principle was adopted by the OECD as the transfer pricing standard for cross-border transactions1.
Unless tax authorities take pains to administer the arm’s length principle, tax avoidance would
reduce a government’s tax revenue and significantly impact social welfare.
Despite the existence of the arm’s length principle, regulators have not been able to prevent tax
avoidance by multinational firms. For example, Amazon pays less corporate tax by designating a
Luxembourg corporation, which has a lower tax rate, as the owner of its inventories. Starbucks has
also increased its profits by consolidating royalties from intellectual property in different countries
into the Netherlands, where the tax rate is lower. In addition, Starbucks has charged high transfer
prices for beans from Switzerland to the UK, thereby increasing profits in Switzerland, which has
a lower tax rate. The arm’s length principle may indeed prevent tax avoidance through transfer
pricing to some extent; however, as this example shows, it is limited. Furthermore, there are exam-
ples of tax avoidance through multinational transfer pricing even when the arm’s length principle
is actually used. This shows that the arm’s length principle is not a completed principle2.
Consumers and national and other local governments that rely on tax revenue have a negative
view of tax avoidance. For example, in the UK, consumers have boycotted Starbucks, which earns
large after-tax profits through tax avoidance, causing damage to Starbucks’ profits (REUTERS
Business News, 2014). In addition, Ethical Consumer called a boycott of Amazon over its excessive
tax avoidance, and Amazon’s reputation has taken a knock from this boycott (Ethical Consumer,
2021). From these examples, it is evident that consumers frown upon tax avoidance by multinational
firms, which in turn has negative consequences for businesses. Of course, as the Starbucks example
shows, the firm’s profits may be harmed directly, but there may also be indirect effects, such as
limiting managers’ future behavior as they would have developed a negative reputation. Such
1Recently, the arm’s length principle has led to a focus on tax avoidance using cost sharing.
2Even if taxing authorities could fully regulate corporations using the arm’s length principle, this would not
necessarily be effective for society, as some studies have shown in theory (Choe and Matsushima, 2013; Matsui,
2011).
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examples imply that negative social reputation may play a role in regulating tax avoidance by
firms.
Focusing on this negative reputation of firms and managers, stigma can be said to accompany
tax avoidance. Stigma refers to social stigma against a person or community. Individuals who
suffer stigma have some psychological stress. Stigma has been the focus of much attention in
sociology and psychology research to date, pioneered by Goffman (1963). As in the previous
example, firms face a stigma in society if they have a poor tax avoidance reputation. This not
only results in psychological costs for the firm’s manager, but may also harm the firm’s future
profits. For example, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, was voted “World’s Worst Executive” by the
International Trade Union Confederation because of Amazon’s shoddy working conditions and
his brazen tax avoidance (International Trade Union Confederation, 2014). This obviously lowers
Amazon’s reputation and causes psychological costs to Bezos. Another example of stigma occurs
when firms do not pay taxes. The New York Times quoted an employee of Italy’s internal revenue
service saying, “along with a new blitz of public service announcements trying to raise the social
stigma on tax evasion, have become crucial as Italy struggles to reduce its $2.5 trillion public debt
and fend off speculative attacks” (New York Times, 2011). This example shows that the stigma
arising from not paying taxes in Italy and tax evasion or avoidance has a serious and negative
impact on the nation’s tax revenue.
In this study, we ask the following question: what are the implications of stigma from tax
avoidance for multinational firms and society? Stigma is expected to help prevent tax avoidance
because it is costly for firms and managers. In particular, because it is difficult in the current
climate to regulate transfer pricing by methods other than the arm’s length principle, stigma is
expected to be a new measure to prevent tax avoidance, replacing the arm’s length principle. If
the psychological cost of stigma can prevent firms from avoiding taxes, then the cost to the tax
authority of applying the arm’s length principle would decrease. Therefore, would it be desirable
for society to use stigma instead of the arm’s length principle? To consider this issue, in this study,
we set the following research questions. (i) How does stigma change the transfer pricing choices of
firms? (ii) Does stigma improve domestic social welfare compared to doing nothing or the arm’s
length principle? (iii) Does stigma improve global social welfare compared to doing nothing or the
arm’s length principle?
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We construct the following simple two-country model in this study. We explore a case in
which a multinational firm has a monopoly in its domestic country and a foreign country. The
headquarters in the domestic country supply products to the foreign subsidiary in the other country.
This multinational firm manufactures products in the domestic country and transfers them to the
foreign subsidiary using multinational transfer pricing. While the multinational firm determines
multinational transfer pricing to maximize the foreign subsidiary’s firm-wide profit and the domestic
country profit, it determines transfer pricing to maximize only the domestic country profit under
the arm’s length principle. This model is the simplest model for analyzing tax avoidance by a
multinational firm in the two-country case. In addition, in this study, we assume that when a
multinational firm (and its manager) engages in tax avoidance behavior, they carry a stigma,
which is costly. We derive the optimal degree of public exposure to maximize social welfare3. We
assume that the regulator (tax authorities) cannot determine the level of stigma costs but can, to
some extent, influence the actual stigma costs incurred by managers by exposing information on
corporate tax avoidance behavior.
Our analysis demonstrates that stigma is an effective means of preventing tax avoidance by
multinational firms. First, we show that cases with stigma improve domestic social welfare more
than cases without stigma and without using the arm’s length principle. This is because the
psychological cost of stigma discourages tax avoidance by multinational firms. In addition, while
we are unable to show that the stigmatized case improves domestic social welfare more than the
arm’s length principle, we show that stigma improves global social welfare more than the arm’s
length principle. This is because the arm’s length principle deprives foreign social welfare due to
higher multinational transfer prices. Meanwhile, stigma can eliminate the unnatural “distortions”
caused by the arm’s length principle and improve global social welfare, because the multinational
firm can respond to cases in which tax rates in foreign countries are higher. This study also identifies
the optimal degree of public exposure. We analyze whether regulators (tax authorities) should be
encouraged to expose tax avoidance information by multinational firms.
The economic analysis of tax avoidance by multinational transfer pricing in the product market
from a political viewpoint dates back to Copithorne (1971) and Horst (1971). The literature then
3As a policy variable for the regulator, we consider the degree of public exposure introduced by Blumkin et al.
(2015).
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analyzed the interaction between firms’ tax evasion strategies and tax policies (e.g., Bond, 1980;
Bond and Gresik, 1996; Calzolari, 2004; Devereux and Keuschnigg, 2009; Elitzur and Mintz, 1996;
Gresik and Nelson, 1994; Gresik, 1999; Gresik and Osmundsen, 2008; Haufler and Schjelderup,
2000; Levinsohn and Slemrod, 1993; Prusa, 1990; Schjelderup and Sorgard, 1997; Schjelderup and
Weichenrieder, 1999; Stoughton and Talmor, 1994; Weichenrieder, 1996). Our study differs from
these works in that we explore the impact of stigma on firms’ behavior and social welfare. Therefore,
our examination has a unique assumption that affects firms’ behavior and social welfare.
Some research demonstrates the negative effect of the arm’s length principle. For example,
assuming the existence of a parallel importer, Autrey and Bova (2012) explore the optimal level of
multinational transfer pricing to maximize firm-wide profit. They demonstrate that, in a specific
economic environment, the arm’s length principle harms both domestic and global social welfare.
The arm’s length principle increases the multinational transfer price and market price of the foreign
country. In this case, because the parallel importer incurs higher marginal cost by the higher
market price, product market competition in the domestic country is modified, and consumer
surplus decreases. As a result, domestic social welfare decreases. While Autrey and Bova (2012)
assume the existence of a parallel importer, our study assumes monopolistic competition in each
country. In addition, Choe and Matsushima (2013) examine competition by two unrelated vertical
market structures. They demonstrate that the arm’s length principle leads to tacit collusion by
unrelated supply chains and harms social welfare. While Choe and Matsushima (2013) analyze two
supply chains and demonstrate the dark side of the arm’s length principle, we consider monopolistic
competition in each market and, by considering stigma, show that the arm’s length principle harms
social welfare. Matsui (2011) also demonstrates the negative effect of the arm’s length principle,
assuming two countries, each with importers and exporters. While Matsui (2011) assumes an
oligopoly market of importers and exporters, we find that an exporter produces (and supplies)
goods in the domestic country and an importer supplies goods in the foreign country.
There are few studies on the stigma of corporate tax avoidance, but there have been many
studies on the stigma of tax evasion in income reporting4. Gordon (1989) introduces social stigma
into the tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Myles and Naylor (1996) analyzes tax
4Myles (1995) and Hindriks and Myles (2013) provide an excellent explanation and survey of tax evasion models
of income reporting.
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evasion in terms of group conformity and social custom. Kim (2003) analyzes the stigma model of
tax evasion by considering income distribution and more generalized taxation. Casal and Mittone
(2016) experimentally test the effects of self-esteem and social stigma on tax evasion in income
reporting. They suggest that social stigma has a stronger effect on tax compliance than social
esteem does5.
Stigma belongs to the analysis field of behavioral economics in a broad sense. In the last decade,
there has been a growing number of behavioral economics studies on tax evasion (Hashimzade et al.,
2013). For example, Trotin (2010) and Piolatto and Rablen (2017) analyze tax evasion behavior
based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Our
study extends the literature by applying stigma to tax avoidance. Based on real-world experience,
we assume that multinational firms face stigma from tax avoidance, as the Starbucks and Amazon
examples show.
The following stigma studies have been conducted in economics: welfare stigma (Besley and
Coate, 1992; Kroft, 2008; Blumkin et al., 2015; Cremer and Roeder, 2015; Kurita et al., 2020; Itaya
and Kurita, 2020), financial stigma (Ennis and Weinberg, 2013; Armantier et al., 2015), stigma
in the labor market (Sessions, 1994), stigma faced by criminals for illegal behavior (Rasmusen,
1996; Harel and Klement, 2007), and COVID-19-related stigma (Katafuchi et al., 2020; Kurita
and Managi, 2020). However, most previous stigma studies in economics have analyzed exogenous
public exposure. In other words, there are few studies on public exposure, which is the extent to
which regulators expose and stigmatize negative corporate behavior in society (Blumkin et al., 2015;
Itaya and Kurita, 2020). While most previous studies do not consider endogenous public disclosure
by tax authorities, we identify optimal public exposure to maximize domestic social welfare.
This study makes the following contributions to the tax avoidance literature on multinational
transfer pricing. First, we incorporate stigma from tax avoidance using a simple model. The
analysis indicates that stigma is effective in influencing taxation, which is a first step in tax research
focused on stigma. In addition, this study demonstrates that stigma improves the global social
surplus and that domestic social welfare can be increased up to a certain level. One of the major
contributions of this study is that the arm’s length principle does not improve global social welfare
as much as stigma does. Another contribution is our analysis of the optimal level of public exposure
5Choo et al. (2016) conduct a laboratory experiment on tax compliance.
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for society. Most prior studies, except Blumkin et al. (2015) and Itaya and Kurita (2020), have
not considered public exposure as a policy tool, and it is not clear how regulators can create
stigma. Therefore, by analyzing the optimal public exposure for tax avoidance, this study makes
an important contribution by clarifying the extent to which multinational firms’ tax avoidance must
be exposed as an alternative to the arm’s length principle.
This study has the following implications for tax authorities and regulators. First, if the arm’s
length principle is imperfect, then the benefits of using stigma as an alternative might be greater, be-
cause stigma can be created by actively exposing the tax avoidance behavior of multinational firms
to society, thereby increasing domestic social welfare up to a certain level. Even using the arm’s
length principle, tax avoidance by multinational corporations has not been successfully deterred.
While it is important to rely on regulations and other mechanisms, there are real psychological fac-
tors weighing against the managers of firms that can be used to change firms and their managers’
behavior. In addition, our analysis of the optimal public exposure degree suggests that revealing
the tax avoidance behavior of firms to society with firmness could increase the stigma of firms and
managers and influence their tax avoidance behavior.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
setting. Section 4 conducts social welfare analysis. Section 5 analyzes the optimal degree of public
exposure. The final section concludes.
2 Basic model
A multinational firm sells products in a domestic country (D) and also sells products in a foreign
country (F ). The multinational firm’s headquarters is responsible for selling products in the do-
mestic country, while the subsidiary is responsible for selling products in the foreign country. In
addition, the factory is located in the domestic country, and it is assumed that the headquarters
manufactures the product. In addition, we assume that the tax rates in the domestic country and
the foreign country are different: the domestic country’s tax rate is τD and that of the foreign
country is τF .
The subsidiary has the authority to make decisions on quantity in the foreign country. In this
study, the foreign subsidiary transfers the products manufactured at the headquarters at a per-unit
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transfer price of t. Hence, the divisional profit of the subsidiary, πF , is
πF = (pF − t)qF , (1)
where pF denotes the market price in the foreign country and qF denotes the quantity in the foreign
country. From Eq. (1), the subsidiary’s after-tax profit is defined as (1 − τF )πF . Because the
performance of the foreign subsidiary is evaluated by this profit, the decision is made to maximize
Eq. (1)6.
The headquarters of the multinational firm manufactures the product at the marginal cost of c.
For simplicity, we normalize c = 0. Firm-wide profit is the sum of the firm’s profit in the domestic
country and the foreign subsidiary’s profit. To define the profit of the multinational firm, we define
the profit in the domestic country, πD, as follows:
πD = pDqD + tqF . (2)
In this case, the after-tax profit is (1 − τD)πD. Given Eqs. (1) and (2), and the assumption that
both countries face different tax rates, the after-tax firm-wide profit of the multinational firm, Π,
is computed as Π = (1− τD)πD + (1− τF )πF . In addition, the manager of the multinational firm
has the following payoff function, V .
V = Π− ST, (3)
where ST represents the degree of stigma felt by the managers of the multinational firm. This
setting of the stigma cost function regards the transfer price under the arm’s length principle as
a kind of “social norm” that the multinational firm must comply with. This means that in this
economy, those who deviate from social norms are stigmatized. This stigma against deviance was
first discussed in Goffman (1963), and Besley and Coate (1992) modeled a stigma cost function
6Deciding to maximize after-tax profit or before-tax profit does not change the foreign subsidiary’s decision
making. Therefore, we assume that the decision is made to maximize pre-tax profit.
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s (tarm − t)2 , (4)
where s > 0 is the public exposure degree of stigmatization, which is assumed to be larger than s :=
τD−τF to ensure non-negative outcomes7. This stigma function shows that when the multinational
firm uses multinational transfer pricing to avoid taxes, there is a psychological cost of stigma for
the manager. In this study, the transfer pricing established by the arm’s length principle is used
as a criterion to determine whether a multinational firm is engaged in tax avoidance. The arm’s
length principle is an important principle established by the OECD, and tax avoidance through
transfer pricing in violation of the principle is a major problem for the international community.
Therefore, s represents the degree of psychological cost of tax avoidance for managers through
public exposure. This setting of the stigma cost function implies that the arm’s length principle is
the social norm in this model, and this norm is deviated from, the stronger the stigma becomes.
The headquarters determines the transfer price and quantity in the domestic country to maximize
Eq. (3).
The multinational firm faces a monopoly in both markets 8. Therefore, we assume the following
demand functions.
pi = ai − qi, i = D, F, (5)
where ai is positive constant.












7An additional analysis using the stigma function constructed with after-tax profits is conducted in Section
¥refsec:dis, and we propose that our main result holds for other stigma functions.





Π firm-wide profit of the multinational firm





t multinational transfer price
D subscript indexing the domestic country
F subscript indexing the foreign country
G subscript indexing global
i subscript indexing a firm
arm superscript indexing the arm’s length transfer price
stig superscript indexing a stigma case
s the public exposure degree of stigmatization: positive constant of stigma
a positive constant
SW social welfare
Using consumer surplus, social welfare in country i is defined as 9
SWi = πi + CSi. (7)
In addition, global social welfare is
SWG = SWD + SWF . (8)
We describe the timeline of our model. First, a manager at the headquarters of a multina-
tional firm determines the multinational transfer price t. Then, the foreign subsidiary and the
headquarters determine the quantities qD and qF . The notations are presented in Table 1.
9In this study, we assume that ST is not included in social welfare. In our social welfare, we do not include the
stigma costs following Blumkin et al. (2015).
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3 Analysis
3.1 Arm’s length transfer price
In this section, we examine the case of the arm’s length principle. In this case, considering the ST
function, ST = 0 because tarm is assigned to t. By backward induction, we start by looking at the
foreign supply decisions of the subsidiary and the headquarters in the second stage.
First, we analyze with decision making in foreign markets. We assume that the foreign market
is a monopoly market for player F (foreign subsidiary). The profit maximization problem in the
second stage of the foreign subsidiary is formulated as follows:
max
qF
πF = (pF − t)qF ,
= (aF − qF − t)qF .
The foreign subsidiary determines its own quantity, given the headquarters’ transfer price in the
first stage. Hence, the first-order condition is
∂πF
∂qF
= aF − 2qF − t = 0.





Next, we consider the domestic market. The domestic market is a monopoly market for the




Π = (1− τD)πD + (1− τF )πF ,
= (1− τD) [(aD − qD)qD + tqF ] + (1− τF )(aF − qF − t)qF .
The headquarters determines its own quantity, given the transfer price t that it determines in the
10In this case, the objective function of the manager, V , is equal to Π because ST = 0.
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first stage. The first-order condition is given as follows:
∂πD
∂qD






In the first stage, the headquarters determines the transfer price for the subsidiary based on
the decisions made in the second stage. Because we are now considering the arm’s length principle,
based on Autrey and Bova (2012), the objective function of the headquarters in this case is the




where the superscript arm represents the outcome in the arm’s length principle. Form Eqs. (9)
and (10), πD(t) is as follows:


































Under the arm’s length principle, the domestic headquarters behaves as if it were dealing with a
third party when dealing with a foreign subsidiary. In other words, when determining the transfer
price, the decision is made to maximize the profit of the headquarters. The analysis in the next
subsection is based on tarm obtained here.











We obtain the following global social welfare SW armG .










3.2 Stigma as a preventing device of tax avoidance
Next, by considering the existence of stigma, we consider a case in which firms avoid taxes without
the arm’s length principle. Here, the headquarters’ objective function at the stage of setting transfer
pricing is different from that in the previous subsection. The maximization problem in this case
can be formulated as follows.
max
t





















s (tarm − t)2 . (15)
From Eq. (15), we obtain following result.
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Result 1 Under stigma, the outcomes are as follows:
tstig =
aF (s− τD + τF )







(1− τD + s)aF







2a2F (s− τD + 1)(s− τD + τF )




a2F (s− τD + 1)
2
4(2s− 2τD + τF + 1)2
,
Πstig = (1− τD)π
stig
D + (1− τF )π
stig
F













a2F (s− τD + 1)(s− τD + τF )
2(2s− 2τD + τF + 1)2
, (16)
SW stigF =
3a2F (1 + s− τD)
2
8(2s− 2τD + τF + 1)2
. (17)
We obtain the following global social welfare SW stigG .





In addition, we define the case in which there is no stigma (s = 0) and no arm’s length principle,




aF (τF − τD)















2a2F (1− τD)(τF − τD)






4(1− 2τD + τF )2
,
ΠB = V B = (1− τD)π
B
D + (1− τF )π
B
F ,





a2F (1− τD)(τF − τD)





8(1− 2τD + τF )2
. (20)






4 Social welfare analysis
4.1 Does stigma improve social welfare?
Does stigma improve social welfare? We compare domestic social welfare SWD in the absence
of stigma (without assuming that it follows the arm’s length principle) with the domestic social
welfare SW stigD under stigma. The difference, SWBD − SW
stig




sa2F (1− τF )
2 (2τD − τF − s− 1)
2 (−2τD + τF + 1)
2 (−2τD + τF + 2s+ 1)
2
, (22)
From Eq. (22), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Stigma improves domestic social welfare, which is higher than in the benchmark
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The intuition of this proposition is as follows. Under stigma, a psychological cost arises based
on the arm’s length principle. The arm’s length principle improves domestic social welfare because
the headquarters maximizes domestic profit without damaging consumer surplus in our model.
Therefore, under stigma, the headquarters sets multinational transfer pricing between the bench-
mark case and the arm’s length transfer price for a psychological cost. This multinational transfer
pricing leads to improved domestic social welfare in our model.
Proposition 1 suggests that stigma improves social welfare, as managers curtail tax avoidance
to reduce stigma costs, even though the government does not conduct tax audits. This result shows
that stigma is one of the most effective ways to prevent tax avoidance. Certainly, stigma is not
a set mechanism, nor is it a direct penalty. While it is difficult for regulators and tax authorities
to regulate with certainty, stigma, if it exists, can restore the social welfare that multinational
tax avoidance reduces. This implies that focusing on stigma has implications for improving social
welfare. Therefore, in the next subsection, we consider whether stigma improves domestic or global
social welfare and argue that stigma is an effective tool for public economics.
4.2 Does the arm’s length principle improve social welfare?
Using the results of the previous analysis, in this subsection, we explore whether the arm’s length
principle improves social welfare. First, we compare domestic social welfare. From Eqs. (12) and
(16), the difference between the arm’s length and stigma cases is as follows:
SW armD − SW
stig
D =
a2F (1− τF )
2
8(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
> 0. (23)
From Eq. (23), SW armD > SW
stig
D always holds. Hence, the arm’s length principle improves domes-
tic social welfare because it encourages the multinational firm to set the multinational transfer price
to maximize domestic profit irrespective of the consumer surplus in the domestic country. While
this outcome theoretically indicates the arm’s length principle’s effectiveness, in practice, some
multinational firms deviate from regulation or avoid tax by other means under the arm’s length
principle. In addition, under the arm’s length principle, the tax authority plays an important mon-
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itoring role of the principle and incurs huge costs doing so. While the arm’s length principle incurs
huge regulation costs by the tax authority, stigma incurs only public exposure costs. Therefore,
stigma plays an important role in regulating the tax avoidance of multinational firms. We discuss
the optimal degree of public exposure in Section 5.
Next, we analyze SW armG − SW
stig
G and obtain the following outcome.
SW armG − SW
stig
G = −
a2F (1− τF )(5 + 12s− 12τD + 7τF )
32(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
. (24)
From Eq. (24), when 5 + 12s − 12τD + 7τF > 0 is satisfied, SW armG < SW
stig
G holds, because
SW armG − SW
stig
G is negative. Hence, s > (12τD − 7τF − 5)/12 is satisfied, and stigma improves
global social welfare. From this outcome, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Stigma improves global social welfare in a specific economic condition more than
the arm’s length principle does. Formally, SW armG < SW
stig
G holds when s > (12τD − 7τF − 5)/12.
This proposition indicates that a large degree of public exposure effectively prevents tax avoid-
ance by multinational firms in multinational transfer pricing. In particular, stigma does not improve
domestic social welfare but does improve foreign social welfare, and thus, restricts tax avoidance by
multinational firms. In addition, we rewrite s > (12τD − 7τF − 5)/12 as τD > (7τF + 12s+ 5)/12.
This condition indicates that when the domestic tax rate, τD, is large, SW armG < SW
stig
G holds,
because stigma prevents tax avoidance by the multinational firm in the domestic country in favor
of seeking a lower tax rate in the foreign country.
This result shows that the arm’s length principle is not a panacea11. The arm’s length principle
is currently considered an effective tool for regulating tax avoidance. However, we find that using
the arm’s length principle instead of stigma would be beneficial to exporters but would be very
damaging to the social welfare of importers. This result implies that regulators (tax authorities)
should use stigma, rather than the arm’s length principle, to improve the calibration of society as
a whole by restricting the behavior of firms, as the arm’s length principle can cause problems in
trade between nations. For example, when a large country exports a product to a country with a
relatively weak economy, and uses the arm’s length principle to focus only on its own tax revenue,
this might aggravate the social welfare of other countries with which it is trading.
11Matsui (2011) also demonstrates the arm’s length principle.
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5 Optimal degree of public exposure
This section presents the optimal degree of public exposure s. We assume that the cost function
of the degree of public exposure is as follows:
σ(s) = γs. (25)
Net social welfare, NSW , is given by
NSWD = SW
stig
D − σ(s), (26)
We define s∗ as the optimal degree of public exposure to maximize net social welfare. s∗ is given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal degree of public exposure is as follows:
s∗ =











Figure 1 shows the determination of the optimal degree of public exposure. The red line is a
curve showing the marginal benefit of an increase in the degree of public exposure, and the blue
line shows the marginal cost of an increase in the degree of public exposure. Their intersection
corresponds to the socially optimal point.
While most previous studies have not analyzed endogenous public exposure, in this study, we
identify the optimal public exposure degree. Our results imply that regulators or tax authorities
can reduce the negative impact of tax avoidance by multinational firms on social welfare by properly
exposing tax avoidance behavior. It is important to note that, in this study, s represents the extent
to which a firm’s tax avoidance behavior is exposed. Therefore, we assume that the regulator causes
firms engaged in tax avoidance behavior to be stigmatized by exposing their behavior. In the real
world, the extent to which a firm faces stigma by exposing its tax avoidance behavior depends
on the situation. However, it will face some degree of harm, as the examples in this study show.
In our study, because we find that choosing s > 0 maximizes domestic social welfare, our results
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Figure 1: Optimal public stigma exposure s∗
Notes: The figure shows the determination of the optimal public stigma exposure. The red line corresponds to
∂SW stigD /∂s, and the blue line corresponds to σ′(s). The figure is drawn by numerical plotting with the parameter
setting: aD = aF = 0.1, τD = 0.5, τF = 0.3, and γ = 0.005.
suggest that public exposure is effective in stopping the decline in social welfare caused by firms’
tax avoidance behavior.
The effects of changes in parameters on the optimal degree of public exposure are summarized
in the following proposition.


















On the one hand, an increase in the marginal cost of exposure and the foreign tax rate reduces
the optimal degree of exposure; on the other hand, an increase in the domestic tax rate and the
intercept of the inverse demand function for the foreign market. This result implies that the
higher the domestic tax rate and demand in the foreign market, the stronger the incentive for the




6.1 An alternative assumption of stigma function







This function becomes larger when the firm-wide profit after tax is larger than that at the time of
the arm’s length principle. Meanwhile, if the firm-wide profit after tax is smaller than the firm-wide
profit after tax at the time of the arm’s length principle, the function becomes smaller, because the
firm is taking actions that contribute more to society. While the effective tax rate can be used, the
denominator includes transfer pricing, making the analysis complicated. In addition, if the stigma
arises from the consumer, as in the Starbucks example in the UK, it is easier to understand profit
rather than effective tax rates. This is because not all consumers understand the effective tax rate,
and they often argue against the multinational “making too much money.”
In this model, we obtain the following outcomes.
tAdd =
(τF − τD)aF















2a2F (1− τD)(τF − τD)











a2F (1− τD) + a
2
D(1− 2τD + τF )
]
4(1− 2τD + τF )
,






where superscript Add denotes the outcomes in Section 6.1. In this subsection, we assume τD <
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(1 + τF )/2 to ensure positive outcomes. Surprisingly, in this subsection, the degree of public
exposure does not affect outcomes, with the exception of V Add.





a2F (1− τD)(τF − τD)





8(1− 2τD + τF )2
. (29)






a2F (1− τD)(3− 7τD + 4τF )
(1− 2τD + τF )2
]
. (30)
Using Eqs. (12), (14), (28), and (30), we compare social welfare in the arm’s length principle with
that in this subsection.
SW armD − SW
Add
D =
a2F (1− τF )
2
8(1− 2τD + τF )2
> 0,
SW armG − SW
Add
G = −
a2F (5− 12τD + 7τF )(1− τF )
32(1− 2τD + τF )2
.
From these outcomes, while SW armD > SWAddD always holds, the sign of the difference between
SW armG and SWAddG alters the economic environment. When τD < (5 + 7τF )/12 holds, we obtain
SW armG < SW
Add
G . In this additional analysis, because we take the reciprocal of the effective tax
rate, the magnitude of the tax rate and the effect of tax avoidance prevention are reversed from the
economic environment in our main analysis. However, this outcome indicates that stigma improves
global social welfare more than the arm’s length principle. Therefore, while the mechanism of
results between the main model and additional analysis is different, we consider our main result to
be robust with other ST functions.
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6.2 The impact of a competitor
In this subsection, we examine the impact of an additional competitor (denoted as R) in the
domestic market. We assume the following inverse-demand function in the domestic market.
pD = aD − qD − θqR,
pR = aD − qR − θqD,
where θ represents substitutability of products supplied by the two firms. In addition, the profit
function of the domestic competitor is
πR = pRqR.
We use Eq. (1) and (3) as the objective function of a subsidiary and a multinational firm, re-
spectively. The timeline of events in this subsection is the same as in the main model. First, the
multinational firm decides the multinational transfer price. Next, all players decide quantities. The
analysis for this subsection is described in the appendix.
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8a2D + a
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Next, we identify the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under stigma without the arm’s length
principle.
t̃stig =
aF (s− τD + τF )
1 + 2s− 2τD + τF






aF (1 + s− τD)
2(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )
.
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2(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
,
π̃stigF =
a2F (1 + s− τD)






Π̃stig = (1− τD)π̃
stig
D + (1− τF )π̃
stig
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3a2F (1 + s− τD)
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a2F (1 + s− τD)(3 + 7s− 7τD + 4τF )
8(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
. (36)
Using the above results, we compare social welfare under stigma with that under the arm’s
length principle. First, consider ˜SW armD − ˜SW
stig







a2F (1− τF )
2
8(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
> 0. (37)
Therefore, in this case, ˜SW armD > ˜SW
stig













a2F (1− τF )(5 + 12s− 12τD + 7τF )
32(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
. (38)





G . This condition is the same
as τD > (12s + 5 + 7τF )/12. Hence, in this case, stigma prevents tax avoidance by multinational
firms in the domestic country in favor of seeking a lower tax rate in the foreign country. This
outcome indicates that stigma improves global social welfare more than the arm’s length principle.
Therefore, we consider our main result to be robust to the presence of a domestic competitor.
7 Implications and conclusion
This study analyzes the tax avoidance behavior of multinational corporations using transfer pricing
from the perspective of stigma. Our results and contributions are as follows. We show that
stigma improves domestic social welfare using a simple model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
stigma yields higher global social welfare than the arm’s length principle. These are our unique
contributions to the literature on tax avoidance by multinational firms using multinational transfer
pricing. Moreover, from the additional analysis, we demonstrate that our main result is robust.
Hence, our simple model is robust and makes an important contribution to public economics.
Our study has the following implications. First, our results imply that focusing on stigma has
implications for improving social welfare. From the results, stigma is one of the most effective
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ways to prevent tax avoidance. Certainly, stigma is not a set mechanism, nor is it a direct penalty.
While it is difficult for regulators or tax authorities to regulate with certainty, stigma, if it exists,
can restore the social welfare that multinational tax avoidance reduces. Second, our results imply
that regulators, rather than using the arm’s length principle, need to use stigma to improve the
calibration of society as a whole by restricting the behavior of firms, as the arm’s length principle
can cause problems in trade between nations. Third, in our study, because we find that choosing
a positive degree of public exposure maximizes domestic social welfare, our results suggest that
public exposure effectively stops the decline in social welfare caused by tax avoidance behavior in
firms.
In reality, the reputation (positive and negative) of a company is formed within country. In
future research, we aim to analyze stigma competition, such as tax competition, in a situation in
which stigma exists in each country, and each government can manipulate the stigma exposure
rate. In addition, as in Autrey and Bova (2012), future research can assume the existence of a
gray market, which would have a key impact on the decisions of the multinational firm. Therefore,
the impact of the gray market should be investigated in future research. Furthermore, the impact
of factory location is important. Matsui (2011) considers an oligopoly market of importers and
exporters. Therefore, we can apply the assumptions of Matsui (2011) to stigma in future research.
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Appendix





sa2F (1− τF )
2 (2τD − τF − s− 1)
2 (1− 2τD + τF + 1)
2 (1− 2τD + τF + 2s)
2
,
The sign of SWBD −SW
stig
D is determined by the sign of (2τD− τF − s−1), because the other terms







= sign[2τD − τF − s− 1].
We define ŝ := 2τD − τF − 1. The difference between s and ŝ is given by
s− ŝ = 1− τD > 0.
Therefore, stigma improves domestic social welfare. ■






− σ′(s) = 0. (A.1)
From (16) and (25), we obtain the optimal degree of public exposure as follows:
s∗ =











Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 3, all outcomes are obtained in a straightforward manner. ■
Analysis for Section 6.2
We analyze the model in Section 6.2. Because, in the foreign market, the decision of the subsidiary
is not affected by the competitor, we apply the outcome of Eq. (9) as a subsidiary quantity in
the second stage (qF = (aF − t)/2). The domestic market is an oligopoly market between players
D (the parent company) and R (domestic competitors). The profit maximization problems of the
multinational firm and the domestic competitor in the second stage can be formulated as follows:
max
qD
πD = (aD − qD − θqR)qD + tqF ,
max
qR
πR = (aD − qR − θqD)qR.
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Solving this maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium in the domestic market in the second
stage as follows:




Under the arm’s length principle, the headquarters behaves as if it were dealing with a third
party when dealing with a foreign subsidiary. In other words, when determining transfer pricing,
decisions are made to maximize domestic profits. In the first stage, player D determines the transfer





where˜denotes the outcome in this case. Here, from qF = (aF − t)/2, and Eq. (A.3), πD(t) is given
by
πD(t) = (1− τD)
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Π̃arm = Ṽ arm =
8a2D + a
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Next, we analyze the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under stigma with competitors. In
this case, the outcomes of the second stage are the same as those in the arm’s length principle case,
and the multinational firm faces the following maximization problem in the first stage.
max
t
V = (1− τD)πD + (1− τF )πF −
1
2
s(t̃arm − t). (A.8)
As a result, we obtain following outcomes.
t̃stig =
aF (s− τD + τF )
1 + 2s− 2τD + τF






aF (1 + s− τD)







a2F (1 + s− τD)(s− τD + τF )
2(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
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π̃stigF =
a2F (1 + s− τD)
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D + (1− τF )π̃
stig
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3a2F (1 + s− τD)
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a2F (1 + s− τD)(3 + 7s− 7τD + 4τF )
8(1 + 2s− 2τD + τF )2
. (A.11)
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